A new fuzzy vault scheme based on subspace codes is proposed and analyzed.
Recently, much work has been done in the area of error correcting codes in projective space. These codes turn out to be appropriate for error correction in random network coding [8] , and are referred to as error correcting random network codes, projective space codes, or subspace codes. The aim of this paper is to show that the construction of the fuzzy vault in [6] can be extended and adapted to work for subspace codes in an analogous way with advantages and limitations. Namely, we present a construction for a fuzzy vault based on constant dimension subspace codes, a class of error correcting codes in projective n-space over a finite field F q . For illustration, an example will be provided by using spread codes, a particular class of subspace codes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides preliminaries, terminology and refreshes the original fuzzy vault scheme. Section 3 presents the new scheme based on subspace codes. Section 4 relates to security and examples and Section 5 to final remarks.
Preliminaries
Denote by F q the finite field with q elements, where q is a prime power. The set difference metric 
It has minimum Hamming distance d min,H (C) = n − k + 1 and cardinality |C| = q k [11] . A constant dimension (subspace) code is a subset of the Grassmannian G q (n, k), the set of all k-dimensional subspaces of F n q . The subspace distance defines a metric on G q (n, k), given by
for U, V ∈ G q (n, k) [8] . While finding good subspace codes is still an open research problem, there are many candidates now, including the Reed-Solomon-like and spread code constructions [8, 12] . An explicit construction of a spread code can be found in [12] , and it is this construction we use as the definition of a spread code: Let p(x) ∈ F q [x] be an irreducible monic polynomial of degree k and P ∈ F k×k q be its companion matrix. Let n = ks for s ∈ N. Then,
is called a (k, n)-spread code, where rowsp(A) is the row space of a matrix A. From the definition, it is straightforward to see that the minimum subspace distance of a spread code is d min,S (S) = 2k and |S| = q n −1 q k −1 . For our purposes we need a unique representation of subspaces, e.g. their matrix representation in reduced row echelon form (i.e. the matrix in reduced row echelon form whose row space is the respective subspace).
We will now briefly revisit the fuzzy vault scheme [6] and we will refer to the following description (cf. also [5] ), although we are aware of different interpretations of the scheme throughout the literature, especially in terms of the decoding algorithms and parameters ( [14] ). Since this scheme is based on polynomial evaluation, it will henceforth be called the polynomial fuzzy vault (PFV) scheme.
the corresponding key polynomial. Let A ⊂ F q be the set of genuine features with |A| = t > ℓ. Choose r > t and select a set B ⊂ F q \A such that |B| = r − t. Construct the sets
We will call P auth the set of authentic points, P chaf f the set of chaff points and V the set of vault points.
If a witness attempts to gain access to the key, the witness submits a set W ⊂ F q . Let Z be the set of vault points with x ∈ W and let |Z| = z. If we use a [z, ℓ] Reed-Solomon code C, then, by the error correction capability of C, we can retrieve the key polynomial if there are at least z+ℓ 2 authentic points in Z. This implies in particular z ≥ ℓ. Indeed let the first coordinates in Z be g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g z and let
If at least z+ℓ 2 second coordinates in Z are evaluations of κ(x), so at most
are not, we can recover the codeword (κ(g 1 ), κ(g 2 ), . . . , κ(g z )) which corresponds to the key polynomial. To simplify the setting and have a more workable model, we can assume that |W | = t and that B = F q \A so that z = t and the error tolerance can be fixed in advance as
It was shown in [13] that certain reasonable parameters for the PFV scheme cause the system to be susceptible to a brute force attack. Choi et al. in [2] speed up the attack by using a fast polynomial reconstruction algorithm. These attacks may indicate that additional security measures should be taken to prevent the loss of a user's features. A different type of security analysis is provided in [5] .
A Fuzzy Vault Scheme Utilizing Subspace Coding
We will now explain our new variant of the fuzzy vault scheme, and call this particular implementation the subspace fuzzy vault (SFV) scheme. Unlike the PFV scheme in which the key is given by the coefficients of a polynomial, the key in this scheme is a particular matrix representation of a subspace, e.g. its matrix representation in reduced row echelon form.
such that rowsp(κ) =κ. We will hide the key by a set of linearly independent features A ⊂ F k q with |A| = k and a set B = F k q \A. Define the sets
P auth is called the set of authentic points, P chaf f is called the set of chaff points, and V the set of vault points.
In order for a witness to decommitκ, a set W ⊂ F k q is submitted and the second coordinates of the elements in the vault whose first coordinates correspond to W are used to generate a subspace W ′ . This subspace is then decoded to yield a codeword U ∈ C. We assume that W consists of at most k linearly independent features.
For a set S ⊂ F k q , we will denote by S κ the subspace spanned by the elements {sκ | s ∈ S}. We will also assume dim(W ′ ) = |W |, although this may not happen, introducing some probability of error, as we mention below. The assumption is justified by estimating its probability using counting formulas like that in the following Lemma 4.1 whilst supposing n big enough and the second coordinates of the chaff points being randomly chosen within their domain.
Theorem 3.2. In the setting of Definition 3.1, the vault recovers the keyκ if and only if
Proof. We can express W ′ = (W ′
. Using properties of the rank and linear algebra identities, we get
Indeed, as |W | ≤ k, |A| = k, and W and A are sets of linearly independent features, Sylvester's rank inequality implies |W \ A| ≤ dim( W \ A κ ), while the inequality in the other direction is obvious, therefore 
Variants
In order to loosen the constraints on the choice of parameters, other settings and scheme variants can be considered, although some probability of error may be introduced.
For example, we can allow |A| = |W | = t ≥ k, with the features thought as randomly chosen in the ambient space rather than linearly independent. Other looser assumptions include also B being a proper subset of F k q \A. In these cases, one needs to compare dim(κ∩W ′ ) with |A∩W | and dim(κ+W ′ ) with |A∪W |. For example dim(κ ∩ W ′ ) is no bigger than k while |A ∩ W | would be no bigger that t; |A ∪ W | wound count elements of A which do not contribute to the dimension ofκ; dim(W ′ ) may not be equal to |W | and the looser assumption on B may reduce the dimension of W ′ even more, introducing further variability.
Depending on the assumptions and parameters, one can expect to have bounds of the form:
for some δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ N. Depending on the given threshold for d ∆ (A, W ), one can estimate the probability of falsely accepting or falsely rejecting the witness.
To be more precise, with the above mentioned looser assumptions, if y is an upper bound of the difference between |A ∩ W | and the maximum number of linearly independent elements within A ∩ W (i.e. y = 0 for the hypothesis of Theorem 3.2), we have on one side
On the other side
where x depends on the assumptions on the size of B and on the choice of chaff points and the parameter n, as discussed above, i.e. x can be neglected if n is big enough, B is the complement to A, and the chaff points are randomly chosen. Similar bounds can also be obtained for t < k.
Incidentally, these inequalities provide an alternative proof to Theorem 3.2.
Security and examples
Notice that we can use n as a degree of freedom to enlarge the size of the key space. We know the following fact from [9] :
The number of δ × n matrices over F q with rank k is given by
With δ = κ we can see that we can play on n to make this number grow as we please, in order to make it hard searching for the right set of k linearly independent features.
Moreover, the complexity of such a brute force attack should be combined with the difficulty of determining the rank of an arbitrary k × n matrix over F q . The naive approach requires at most n(k 2 − k) operations, and in case the field is F 2 at most n(k 2 − k)/2. There exist fast algorithms for determining the rank of a matrix but these are asymptotically better and are often much worse for small values of k and n.
Variants
Not only when |A| = t > k, some difficulty in decoding may arise, but if t is much bigger than k, other types of brute force attacks may be devised. In the following a strategy is described which tries to find a set in F n q containing k linearly independent vectors that are meant to reveal the authentic features.
Assume now to have t authentic points and r − t chaff points, with the set of features {x 1 , ..., x t } being a set of random elements of F k q . We can assume that the second coordinates of the authentic set {x 1 κ, ..., x t κ} contains a set of k linearly independent vectors in F n q . Indeed, given Lemma 4.1, we can compute the probability that x 1 κ, ..., x t κ contains a set of k linearly independent vectors as
that is the probability that (x 1 , ..., x t ) T is a rank k matrix. For common vault parameters, and especially for larger t, this value is close to 1, so as to justify our assumptions. Now, the expected number of subsets of size δ out of r > δ random points in F n q that span a k-dimensional space can be estimated as
Ideally, an attacker would want to find a δ 0 ≤ |A| = t so that α q (k, δ 0 , n) < 1 in order to have a high probability of recovering the key in the event that the δ 0 points span a space of dimension k. On the other side, to counter this type of attack, one tries to keep k very close to t and r big enough, so that α q does not get small. We will approximate the complexity of a brute force attack following this approach. The attack is similar in approach to that proposed in [6] and depends on finding a suitable δ 0 so that the probability of δ 0 random vectors in F n q spanning a subspace of dimension k is small. It is noted in [13] that the average number of attempts for a user to guess δ points in the authentic set is r δ / t δ < 1.1(r/t) δ for r > t > 5. Given that it takes n(δ 2 − δ)/2 operations to row reduce a δ × n binary matrix, we obtain the following upper bound for the expected time to recover the key. 
Example Using Spread Codes
As an example of how to construct a vault using subspace codes, we will use spread codes defined in Section 2. Spread codes are somewhat restrictive in that the minimum distance is completely determined by k, unlike other subspace codes where one can trade off the distance with other parameters. Nevertheless we illustrate the construction using spread codes because of their simplicity. Example 4.3. Let us assume that the features belong to F 16 2 , so that k = 16. In this case, we can recover the key if and only if the set difference is at most 15. We are free to choose n as long as it is a positive integer multiple of k. For example we can choose n = 96 so that we have roughly 2 80 keys.
It is shown that an (n, k) q spread code can be decoded in O((n − k)k 5 ) operations. For more information on spread codes and an efficient decoding algorithm, the reader is referred to [12] .
Further considerations
One of the disadvantages of using a biometric for security is that once an attacker knows a user's features, the user can never use a biometric scheme based on those features again. In the PFV finding the key is essentially equivalent to finding the features, as they are immediately retrievable as the first coordinate of the points in the authentic set, i.e. by testing whether these correspond to evaluations of the key polynomial. In the SFV, instead, an attacker who is capable of obtainingκ, has no big advantage in recovering x 1 , ..., x t from x 1 κ, ..., x t κ, not knowing which particular κ was used to generate the second coordinates of the authentic points. Ideally, to make the system even more resilient, the user should have the features obscured, for instance one might want to store in the vault a hash of the features, instead of the features themselves, as A = {(h(x), xκ) | x ∈ A} B = {(h(x), y) | x ∈ C, y ∈ rowsp(κ)},
for a suitable hash function h. There is also another important reason to use hashes as above in the system. In fact, suppose that an attacker finds an element in the unhashed version of the vault whose first coordinate is a linear combination of other first coordinates of other elements in the vault. Then he can check whether its second coordinate is also a linear combination (with the same coefficients) of the corresponding second coordinates of the other elements. If this happens he can argue that the element belongs to A. Clearly also this attack can be prevented by taking t close to k, besides using an hash function to hide the first coordinates.
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